
Class 






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SMITHSOMHW DKPOSIT 



THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH 



MONMOUTH COURT -HOUSE OR FRBEHOLD, SUNDAY, 28TH JJCJNE, 1 77S 

BY 



JOHN WATTS de PEYSTER 



Reprinted from The Magazine of American History. fuh\ 1878 



The Engagement at Freehold, 



KNOWN AS THE 



Battle of Monmouth, N. J., 



MORE PROl'ERLY OK 



MONMOUTH COURT-HOUSE, 

28TII JUNE, 1778. *&&■ 

* 

\ 

"C'esl la solide pierre ok s'asseoit le * * siicle." 

— Michelet. 



"Thus, on the whole, it was a pitched battle; the advantage, if any, being rather on 
the side of the British, who had fought only to secure their retreat, and who had succeeded 
in that object." —Lord Mahon's History of England, VI., 250. 



For the Americans the delivery of this battle was a political necessity. Clinton's continued 
or resumed retreat converted a drawn battle into a decided victory for the Colonies. Frederic 
the Great pronounced the result disastrous to the British cause, and the verdict of events has 
confirmed the justice of his opinion. 



NEW YORK: 

A. S. BARNES & CO., PUBLISHERS, 

in & 113 William Street. 

1878. 






THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH 

MONMOUTH COURT-HOUSE, OR FREEHOLD, SUNDAY, 28TH JUNE, 1 778 

The evacuation of Philadelphia by the British was the first tangible 
result, in favor of the Americans, of the French treaty of Alliance. This 
was signed 6th February, reached Falmouth Harbor (Portland, Me.) 
13th April, and was communicated to Congress 2d May, and celebrated in 
the camp at Valley Forge (6th) 7th May, 1778. The bitterest sufferers by 
the British abandonment of Pennsylvania were the loyalists. To them 
this revolution was misery, ruin and exile. Sir William Howe, at his 
own request, had been relieved of his command and superceded by Sir 
Henry Clinton. This was after the mutual fiasco of " Barren Hill, 18th 
May," in which both were concerned or present on one side and La 
Fayette on the other. 

Clinton received the command of an army partially disaffected. The 
German element was no longer thoroughly reliable. As proof of this 
he had to dispatch at least one German regiment to New York by sea, 
fearing to trust it by land ; he moreover lost, according to different 
accounts, by desertion, etc., from 1,000 to 2,000 in his twelve days' retreat 
through the Jerseys. Of these 600, principally Hessians, stole away to 
rejoin their wives, married during the winter sojourn in the " City of 
Brotherly Love." 

Clinton evacuated Philadelphia on the 18th June, 1778. This opera- 
tion was so ably conceived and carried out that he experienced no hin- 
drance or even annoyance from Washington, although the latter was 
expecting and watching it. This movement began at 3 A. M., and by 
10 A. M. everything — troops and material — were safely across the Dela- 
ware, and ready for the march through New Jersey to the sea. 

The Hessian General and military critic, Baron von Ochs, in his 
"Reflections upon the New Art of War," (Casscl, 1817), pronounced 
Clinton's retreat across Jersey more remarkable than that of Moreau 
through the Black Forest in October (1st— 1 5th), 1796, which the best 
judges have considered a masterpiece if not a miracle of soldiership. 

The British retreat was impeded much more by heavy rains and more 
than extraordinary heat of the weather — the worst meteorological alter- 
nations for rapid movements — than by any military expedients and im- 



2 THE RATTLE OF MONMOUTH 

liments. So promptly, indeed, did Clinton move, that the American 
detachments sent to destroy the bridges, etc., could not complete their 
work sufficiently well, or in time to arrest his march. 

The British moved in two divisions. Nothing is more discordant 
than the estimate of Clinton's and of Washington's armies, except the 
accounts of their collision at Monmouth. Irving says (111. 416), the 
former had " about 9,000 to 10,000, Washington a little more than 
12,000 Continentals [regulars, in the best sense of the word] and about 
1,300 militia." Washington, from certain strategic reasons, did not 
always state his numbers accurately; for instance, at White Plains, 
"and was brought to book for it." The discrepancy, about equal to 
the number of militia present, was excused on the plea that, "no old 
'war-horse' ever counted his militia as effectives." Marshall, admir- 
able authority, referring to clear contemporaneous corroboration, 
says: "the British army was computed at 10,000 effectives; that of 
the Americans amounted to between 10,000 and 11,000." The argu- 
ments lor ami against hazarding an action were founded on some such 
relative figures. According to the British " Official Returns " of March 
26, 1778, 1 lowe's (afterward Clinton's) strength comprised 13,078 Eng- 
lish, 5,202 Germans, and 1,250 [Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Mary- 
land Royalist or] Provincials; total 19,350. Any such estimate for 
Clinton's active force in June would be a gross exaggeration. The 
American strength, on the other hand is, as a rule, always depreciated. 
If there is a detailed register of Washington's army it has not been 
accessible, otherwise how are such discordant enumerations possible? 
The aggregate usually given is 15,000. Doubtless, including mobilized 
militia and temporary levies, it was very much greater than the British. 
Gordon (III. 133) quotes a letter of Washington of the 24th of June 
(four days before the light) in which he savs: "The enemy's force is 
between 9,000 and 10,000 rank and file [this is vague and like the late 
rebel returns]; the American army on the ground is 10,648, rank and 
file, besides the advanced brigade under Genera] Maxvi ell of about 1,200 
and 1,200 Militia." Add officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians, 
details, etc., and this might swell Washington's actual strength to over 
18,000 continentals, etc. As to the militia there is no certain reckoning. 
Marshall says: "The militia had returned to their homes immediate!} 
alter the action." A corresponding calculation, taking into account 
the admitted wholesale desertions, would give Clinton, all told, at 
the very utmost 13,000 fighting nun.' An American writer who has paid 
close attention to this subject, remarks that Washington's "army was 



THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH 3 

fully equal in numbers to that of the enemy, and * * * was not 
wanting in energy and nerve." It is most likely, counting regulars, 
mobilized militia and temporary levies, Washington's total was to 
Clinton's as 3 to 2. 

Clinton's line of retreat from Philadelphia to Sandy Hook was about 
due north-east. Washington, as usual, crossed at Coryell's Ferry, 2 
some thirty (40?) miles directly N. N. E. of Philadelphia, and thence 
moved almost at right angles forty to fifty miles eastward to the 
encounter at Monmouth. Thus pursuing on two sides of the triangle, he 
had to march altogether from eighty to ninety, perhaps one hundred 
miles, according to the roads ; the English, following the hypothenuse, 
between sixty to seventy miles. <- 

Clinton's train and baggage, including bat or baw-horses, etc., 
extended 12 to 14 miles. The protection of this long procession was con- 
fided to Knyphausen (perhaps on account of the proneness to desert 
evinced by the Germans). It was compelled to move on a single road, 
since there was only one then in existence which was practicable 
for carriages, and even this was heavy from rain and loose deep 
sand. 

As soon as the Americans showed themselves in force on the 27th 
June, Clinton drew up or deployed the column or division under the 
immediate command of Cornwallis, and with which he remained along 
and across the roads, fronting, from S. W. to N. E., Monmouth Court- 
house or Freehold, as it should be more properly called. His troops, 
in fact, must have lain all about or around the settlement on the night of 
the 27th-28th. This village (or hamlet, a century since) is the capital 
of the alluvial county of Monmouth, which lies south of Raritan Bay 
and along the Atlantic from Sandy Hook to Manasquam Inlet, just 
north of the famous " Squam Beach." It is a central point at the inter- 
section of three roads ; the first from Princeton and Trenton to the 
West, passes through Englishtown, some five to six miles distant to the 
W. or W. N. W., according to different surveys ; the second, from 
(South) Amboy to the north, and the third from Middletown to the 
N. E., and Shrewsbury to the east. The last two join a little east of the 
Court-House. 

Almost the whole of Clinton's front, and particularly his left wing, 
was protected by a marsh and thick wood, and in his rear was a difficult 
defile. In regard to no engagement of the revolution is there less clear, 
defined or concurrent information than to Monmouth, fought on a bril- 
liant Sunday, _'Sth June, 1778. It is a tohu-bohu of words, very much 



4 THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH 

like the fighting. The clearest digested statement is by the British 
General, 1 Ion. Sir Edward Cust, a very impartial annalist, who wrote 
in 1862. 

It would seem as if Washington might have started with the plan to 
stop Clinton, whose heterogenous force was not as unanimous in spirit 
as is generally believed, to hold him at the Raritan and its marshes 
with his disciplined troops, as Burgoyne was impeded between Lake 
Champlain and the Hudson, and everywhere on this river and its afflu- 
ents; accumulate militia around him as Schuyler did about Burgoyne, 
and then swarm him out — the Northern army from the Hudson work- 
ing in as a part of the machinery — as the British army was disposed of 
September 13th — October 17th of the previous year. This might have 
actually occurred if Lee had done his whole duty, if Morgan had 
struck in on time, always supposing, as was doubtless correct, the 
Americans (between continentals and militia) outnumbered the enemy, 
perhaps two to one on the actual scene of the conflict or absolute point 
of collision. 

Lee, in reality, in action, commanded the American advance, 5,000 
strong, which was at first assigned to La Fayette, who is relieved of all 
or any blame through his actual, if not nominal, supersedure by Lee. 
The right wing, main body, was commanded by Greene and the left by 
Lord Stirling. [Washington was with the former, and Steuben was at 
first with La Fayette, and afterwards, with Stirling.] While Lee 
made a partial demonstration, not an actual attack, on Clinton near 
the Court-house, Morgan, just as in the Burgoyne battles, was to 
operate with his riflemen on the British left, while Maxwell and others, 
with Dickinson's militia regiments, threatened the British right and 
even right rear. Morgan did not get into action at all. He remained 
at Richmond Mills, three miles south of Freehold or Monmouth Court- 
house, in full hearing of the firing, and for some inexplicable reason did 
nothing. If all the forces, flanking and holding, had done their duty as 
Wayne discharged his, Clinton might actually have been " Burgoyned." 

The skirmishing began between 7 and ,x a. m., and continued, through 
four distinct phases, until noon. 

Clinton, perfectly aware that it would not do to allow any confusion to 
affect his twelve-mile-long baggage train, made a brisk return on Lee, with 
picked troops |" which could not easily be equalled," as was remarked 
by a contemporary] belonging to the division of Cornwallis. Lee 
gave way at once; and it is charged that the consequent disadvantages 
sustained by the Americans were due to his bad behavior, founded on 



THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH 5 

the intention to limit, if not frustrate a decided victory in favor of 
Washington. The Americans were driven back full two miles and a 
half. At the most critical moment Washington arrived, and all was 
disorder, if not even positive dismay ; his presence gradually, if not 
immediately, restored the confidence which the troops under Lee had 
lost, in a great measure, through the fault or mismanagement of their 
commander. Checked in turn, Clinton assailed the American columns 
moving to flank him. The American left was roughly handled by 
the British cavalry and infantry ; but ever reliable Wayne finally held 
the Royal troops in check, and with the cooperation of Greene to their 
left finally repulsed them, even after they were reinforced from 
Knyphausen's division. Here, in front of Wayne, the gallant British 
Lieutenant-Colonel (Brevet General?) Honorable H. Monckton fell. 
This spot is about two miles west from the Court-House. 

Steuben first restored matters on the American left, and it is said that 
such was the confidence reposed in him by the soldiers "that they, 
although severely pressed by the enemy, wheeled into line with as 
much precision as on an ordinary parade, and with the coolness and 
intrepidity of veteran troops. Alexander Hamilton was struck with 
this change, and was afterwards heard to say that he had never known 
or conceived the value of military discipline till that day." Farther 
than this there is no use of endeavoring to solve what appears a 
military conundrum. Suffice it to add that, with fluctuating fortunes, 
both Generals fed the fight with fresh troops until Clinton fell back in 
good order behind a defile similar to that in front of which he made his 
first stand. By this time it was night ; the firing and fighting, desultory, 
unsatisfactory, had lasted — through four other phases — seven or eight 
hours; a terrible ordeal in such an overpowering heat, and on such 
a soil. 

This battle, " pitched " or " drawn," whatever it is styled by his- 
torians, was scarcely regulated and was not terminated by valor or by 
soldiership, but by the unbearable sultriness of the day. " Both sides, 
however, record that the extreme heat of this day was seldom equalled, 
and that the British and American soldiers alike felt their energies so 
oppressed by the unusual sultriness that they contented themselves 
with removing their wounded, and desisted altogether from active hos- 
tilities. On the side of the English fifty-nine soldiers are said to have 
perished in this action without a wound, merely through the excessive 
heat and fatigue." " A number of the Americans likewise died from the 
same cause, and it is said that in very many cases the tongues were so 



6 THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH 

swollen from hent and thirst that officers and men were rendered 
speechless." "The horses fell dead in troops." One Major-General lost 
three horses in succession from the same cause. 

It is justly claimed that the vicissitudes and discipline of Valley 
Forge manufactured the American military personel into an army, and 
the four phases ol Monmouth proper, not the four preliminary skir- 
mishes, developed the maneuvering capabilities of this army under fire, 
and thoroughly demonstrated its new fighting power. The word "vic- 
tory" is so generally missapplied thai as usual this title is claimed by 
both sides for Monmouth. If to frustrate the intention of an opponent, 
and carry out one's own purpose constitutes a triumph, the palm 
undoubtedly belongs to Clinton. 1 Ie secured his retreat. If, however, 
to relinquish a field to which a rebel army has been drawn, and on which 
it should have been fought to the bitter end, and was not, is not a failure 
in the performance of the duty expected from a royal commander, it is 
difficult to understand what such a duty on his ]>art can be construed to 
mean. Escape in this exigency was certainly not victory. An impartial 
examination leads to the conclusion that Clinton was too greatly out- 
numbered to justify a prosecution or renewal of the engagement on his 
part. To secure his train he was reduced to making a return or counter 
blow — a rear-guard fight — encountering the bulk of the American army 
with at most, two-thirds of his own forces. Perhaps he did not bring 
over half his troops into actual collision with his opponents. Clinton's 
determination at Monmouth was a type of "Mad Anthony's" return 
upon Comwallis at Green Springs, near Jamestown, Va., 6 July, i/Si ; 
of Longstreet, upon McClellan, at Williamsburg, 5th May, 1862. The 
fighting hero of the American army at Monmouth was Wayne; 
Washington must, in some degree, share even his marvelous influential 
strength with Steuben. 

Washington certainly did not succeed in accomplishing what he set 
out to do. But he slept on the battle-field and buried the dead. Con- 
sequently, as in so many other instances, although militarily it was a 
drawn battle, nationally, it is recognized as a victory. 

When the morning of Monday, 29th June, 1778, broke, and the 
Americans arose to renew the struggle, the English had gone, and had 
even carried off the majority of their wounded. 

"Clinton marched without further opposition to Navisink [or Neversink], a 
highland in the neighborhood of Sandy Hook, where he arrived on the 30th, and 
found [Admiral] Lord Howe, who had got there the day before with the fleet from 
the Delaware. 'This was a mon opportune occurrence than could have been 



THE BATTLE OF MONMOUTH 7 

anticipated, for it had so happened that in the preceding winter a violent breach 
of the sea had cut off the peninsula of Sandy Hook from the Continent, and con- 
verted it into an island, so that it was necessary to throw a bridge of boats across 
the intervening water. This was now speedily and skillfully executed by extra- 
ordinary efforts on behalf of the seamen, and the whole army was thus passed 
over the new channel on the 5th of July, and were afterwards conveyed by sea to 
New York. Soon after this the Provincial army took up its position at White 
Plains [Westchester Co., N. Y.], * * where it remained till late in the 
autumn." 

Monmouth was the last field in America whereon ten thousand men 
on each side contended for victory, or were even present. After this 
date the war was made up of comparative skirmishes or actions, whose 
objectives alone gave to them the dignity of battles. In one respect, how- 
ever, it was THE Battle of the Revolution, for upon its parched, deep, 
sandy field occurred the "new birth" of the American regular soldier. 
Hereon he showed himself the first-class maneuvering as well as fighting 
power, substantiated subsequently on a thousand fields — in Canada, 
in Florida, in Mexico, at the West, and on the gor)' checker-boards of 
the "great American conflict" waged to crush or to sustain the 
mightiest Rebellion which ever convulsed a nation." 

JOHN WATTS oe PEYSTER 

1 The writer arrived at these figures — 13,000 for Clinton and 20,000 for Washington — by a 
careful but curious calculation. Since this article was in print chance threw in his way Von 
Eelking's " Hulfstruppen," in which a Hessian officer present corroborates these estimates. This 
German says that Clinton " had scarcely 13,000 men"; "3,000 [cavalry and infantry] went off 
with [Admiral Howe's] ships" ; that " Washington's strength was held to be about 20,000 men" ; 
and that " the cannonade on both sides at Monmouth was heavier than was heard elsewhere during 
the war." His description of the fourteen-mile long baggage train is amusing. The affluent 
British officers dragged along with them masses of baggage, carriages, draft and saddle-horses, all 
sorts of servants, mistresses, and every kind of other useless stuff. If Clinton's traps had fallen 
into the hands of some of Washington's primitive or puritan regiments from the back settlements, 
these would have aroused in them as much astonishment as the surprise excited among Frederick of 
Prussia's " Monhs of the Flag," at the composition of the impedimenta of the French officers, 
captured after Rosbach. [Washington's 20,000 ; see Lossing's F. B. A. R., ii., 146-147 (1).] 

2 It is worthy of remark that the route followed by Washington, was the one almost invariably 
adhered to by him in all his movements in and through the Jerseys. On this occasion it was doubt- 
less taken with a view to intercept Clinton at Brunswick. This route bore the same relation to the 
stereotyped line pursued by the British in the Jerseys, that the Shenandoah valley held to the usual 
line of the Union advance southwards, from the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge, and afforded the 
same relative advantages. It had water courses to block the enemy's way and serve as wet ditches to 
positions ; passes as sally-ports ; a mountain range as a line of permanent entrenchments, and 
opportune spurs as bastions or detached works. All the territorial or physical advantages were in 
favor of the Americans ; all the material, of the British. During the Revolutionary War, New 
Jersey was a more difficult country for the Royalists to fight over than even Virginia proved to the 
Unionists during the " Slaveholder's Rebellion." It afforded the best defensive positions, defiles, 
marshes, miry streams, and beyond these and rising from them, gentle slopes — the very best dispo- 
sition of land for the most effective play of artillery — stone houses for detached parties, and all the 
peculiarities which a weaker force could desire to hold or harass a stronger invader. 



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